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THE ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS
DOCTRINE: FEDERALISM, UNIFORMITY, EQUALITY
AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
DONALD L. BELL
T HE CURRENT construction of the adequate state grounds doc-
trine involves the presumption of Supreme Court jurisdiction over
state court cases that are ambiguous as to their grounds of decision.
This article explores the judicial history of the doctrine-the principles
that brought it into being and those that support its continued exis-
tence. First, the basic federalist principles which are significant to both
the Supreme Court's current and past formulations of the doctrine are
discussed. Then, after pointing out the many conflicts between the Su-
preme Court's current formulation of the adequate state grounds doc-
trine and other Supreme Court policies, the author proceeds to explore
matters of uniformity and individual liberty and how these concepts
traditionally have been treated as almost synonymous, but recently ap-
pear to be at odds in many Supreme Court decisions. Ultimately, an
argument is made for abandonment of the current approach as an un-
reasonable construction of the doctrine that results in unreasonable ap-
plications. The doctrine's application should be limited to cases of
procedural default and procedural adequate state grounds-areas in
which the presumption of jurisdiction has not been used frequently.
I. INTRODUCTION: FEDERALIST ORIGINS TO MODERN POLICY
The purpose of this article is to explore the jurisprudential considera-
tions upon which the United States Supreme Court has chosen to build
its jurisdictional policies. The discussion focuses on the adequate state
grounds doctrine, not because it dominates the constitutional land-
scape, but because it is so close to the heart of the theories of federal-
ism and uniformity of law that have controlled the Court's recent
decisions.
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is a jurisdic-
tional rule that grew from roots established in Murdock v. City of
Memphis.1 For the first time, that decision outlined the basic rule that
1. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). For a case-by-case exposition on the historical develop-
ment of the substantive adequate state grounds doctrine, see Elison and NettikSimmons, Feder-
alism and State Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds,
45 MONT. L. REv. 177 (1984).
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if a state court articulates an adequate state ground for its decision,
independent of federal law, then the Supreme Court is without jurisdic-
tion. 2 Murdock points out that there may be matters sufficiently broad
to sustain the state court's judgment independent of federal law. 3 This
reflects the federalist principle that state courts are the ultimate arbiters
of state law, 4 yielding to the United States Supreme Court only when
their interpretations of state law fall beneath the minimal level pre-
scribed by the Federal Constitution.' The decision further limits the Su-
preme Court's jurisdiction to those state court decisions that hold
"against" a federal right. 6 To the uninitiated, this assumption would
seem to go without saying. The assumption is, however, inaccurate.
Other limitations arise from the words indicating that only "errone-
ously decided" cases are subject to review. 7 Even in those cases holding
against a federal right, the Court's power of review is limited to issuing
an affirmance if the state court has accurately interpreted federal law.8
Again, obvious statements of truth have been contradicted by recent
Supreme Court decisions. 9 An accurate and complete reading of Mur-
dock suggests that when a state court articulates an adequate state
ground for its decision, independent of federal law, and simultaneously
2. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 635-36.
3. Id. at 635.
4. "[W]e think it equally clear that . the Supreme Court, as a court of appeal from the
State courts, . . . [is] limited to the questions of a Federal character." Id. at 631 (emphasis in
original). See also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1980); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (more recent decisions articulating the same position).
5. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 634. See also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) ("State
courts are free to attach . . . such consequences as they think appropriate under state constitu-
tions and laws, subject only to the requirements of the Constitution of the United States.").
There is also a strong argument for the proposition that once adopted by a state court, federal
law becomes part of the state's common law and once it is adopted by a state legislature, it
becomes part of the state statutory or constitutional law and therefore not subject to Supreme
Court review. The Supreme Court has recognized the opposite side of this jurisdictional coin.
See Grayson v. Harris, 279 U.S. 300, 303 (1929); Joines v. Patterson, 274 U.S. 544 (1927) (state
law, once adopted by Congress, becomes federal law together with all the interpretations placed
on it by the state courts); See also 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982) (explicitly adopting state law as federal
law). However, in the adequate state grounds context, the Court has ignored the idea that fed-
eral law can ever become state law by virtue of adoption. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553 (1983) (finding state constitutional provision not sufficiently independent of federal
law, and therefore reviewable); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (finding that state common
law had been adopted from federal cases and therefore was reviewable). Such findings are par-
ticularly troublesome when a state constitutional provision is at issue, since many state constitu-
tions predate the United States Constitution.
6. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 636.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. While the Court now has discretion to review decisions in favor of an asserted right,
that discretion should be exercised on a very limited basis. For most of history, that has been the
case. See infra notes 10-13, 139-144 and accompanying text (discussing certiorari jurisdiction).
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upholds minimal constitutional standards, the Supreme Court is with-
out jurisdiction. In the usual case, the Court has jurisdiction over state
court interpretations of federal rights only when the decision is in error
and is against the asserted right.
The Supreme Court did not conclude independently that these juris-
dictional restrictions were necessary. The decision in Murdock ° and
other early cases" reflected an attempt by the Supreme Court to limit
the reach of its appellate jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions
of federalism" as originally expressed by Congress in the Judiciary
Act. 3 The adequate state grounds doctrine was but one of many feder-
alist barriers established between state and federal government to pre-
vent federal authorities from riding roughshod over states determined
to remain independent.' 4
When the Constitution was created, the framers had just recently
been forced to extreme acts of revolution in order to shed a strong cen-
tral government. Most were not anxious to see a new one spring up in
its place.' 5 The framers could not foresee from which branch of govern-
ment the threat of centralization might arise and, therefore, were
equally anxious to limit the power of the federal judiciary along with
the other two branches of government. What has come to be known as
federalism was simply a series of practical governmental devices de-
signed to prevent the central government from becoming too strong
(too central). 6 Limiting the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the deci-
10. In spite of changes in the Judiciary Act eliminating language that restricted the Court's
jurisdiction, the Court wisely adhered to the view that its jurisdiction did not extend to the areas
just discussed; instead, Murdock reaffirmed the principles expressed in earlier cases. See Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-29 (1962).
11. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 366 (1893) (applying and clarifying the holding of Mur-
dock). See also Cook County v. Calumet & Chicago Canal Co., 138 U.S. 635, 651 (1891); Ma-
guire v. Tyler, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 650, 664-65 (1869); Neilson v. Lagow, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 98,
110(1851).
12. "[Tlhe powers . . . lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those
reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes
of the Union." THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (J. Madison), in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS
327 (J. Lewis ed. 1967) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST No. 46].
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. Section 25 contained language
limiting Supreme Court review of state cases to those decided on federal grounds. The Judiciary
Act of 1867 deleted that language. Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 386-87. The
Supreme Court currently derives both its appellate and certiorari jurisdiction over state court
decisions from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1982). The complete text of the statute is reprinted infra note
29.
14. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 12.
15. Eldridge Gerry was one of many who feared the new Constitution would lead to a
monarchy. See, e.g., Gerry, Observations by a Columbian Patriot, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS
FEDERALISTS 185 (J. Lewis ed. 1967).
16. See supra note 12.
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sions of state courts was simply one such device. 17 The adequate state
grounds doctrine is a tool of federalism; it is a practical expression of
the fear of centralized governmental power.
Recognizing that the adequate state grounds doctrine or, for that
matter, any of the tools of federalism arise from the fear of centralized
government, one must also realize that governmental power, as it re-
lates to the individual citizen, can be centralized just as easily in the
state as in the national government. 8 The effect of centralized power
on individual citizens is much the same regardless of where the power
rests. 9 To avoid what had been so objectionable under the English sys-
tem-the concentration of power in the hands of one body-the fram-
ers devised a tripartite separation of powers at the federal level.20
However, there remained the danger that power could become concen-
trated in the hands of a central government. In response to this concern
the framers devised a parallel separation of powers; they divided power
between the federal government and the states.2' The dual system22 of
power that emerged was designed to provide individuals with the maxi-
mum degree of protection from the possibility that an overbearing gov-
ernment might arise to usurp their freedoms. The revolution was not
merely a struggle between competing governments-one seeking to
maintain the status quo and the other seeking to grasp new power.23
Rather, it was an effort by individuals to establish new freedoms that
were unattainable under the existing system.24 The Constitution was cre-
ated not only to provide for a new system of government, but also to
limit that government's ability to interfere with individual rights. The
17. See generally J. FITZGERALD, CONGRESS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1986) (dis-
cussing the many devices that are employed to limit governmental power).
18. Madison noted that devices for dividing governmental power were "inventions of pru-
dence" equally useful in limiting state or federal power. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), in
ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS 350 (J. Lewis ed. 1967) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST No.
51].
19. When a person suffers the loss of a protected right it makes little difference whether the
loss was because of state action or federal action; the end result is the same.
20. "The framers believed that if they could divide the national authority into three auton-
omous branches . . . then these provisions, coupled with the power reserved to the states, would
effectively prevent the new central government from achieving ascendancy over its citizens." J.
FITZGERALD, supra note 17, at 27.
21. Id.
22. See generally Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever- Whirling Wheels of American Federalism,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063 (1984).
23. Madison asked the rhetorical question: "[W]as the precious blood of thousands spilt
... not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the ...
States ... might enjoy a certain extent of power?" He compared this to the notion that "people
were made for kings, not kings for the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison), in ANTI-
FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS 317 (J. Lewis ed. 1967) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST No. 451.
24. See generally The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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threat to individual rights under the English system had not arisen from
some outside force but from government itself and so the framers
sought to divide and conquer the potential threat. They understood that
the ultimate purpose of any government must be to provide for the ben-
efit and protection of its citizens. 25 Under our system, powers are not
divided between competing governments (state and federal) and com-
peting branches of government for government's sake alone. 26 Powers
are divided under our system of government because division limits the
possibility that government will reserve power to itself to the detriment
of individual rights.
In recent times, the Supreme Court has concluded that there is an
adequate state grounds "problem.' '27 While the holding of Murdock
clearly states the adequate state grounds doctrine, it fails to identify
clearly when an adequate state grounds problem arises. This is because
for most of our country's history no such problem existed. The prob-
lems that now exist are the direct result of cases that have been decided
recently. 21
Few jurisdictional problems can arise in cases decided by a state
court solely on the basis of either federal or state law. If a state court
holds against a federal right, the Supreme Court unquestionably has
jurisdiction.2 9 It is similarly clear that when a state court enters a deci-
25. The purpose of distributing governmental powers was to make each office a "check"
on the others. "[Tihe private interest of every individual" was to be "a sentinel over the public
rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 12, at 350.
26. "[Tlhe public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme
object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it
may be fitted for the attainment of this object." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 23, at 317.
27. O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. 1, 5 (1984).
28. See infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) confers Supreme Court jurisdiction over state court decisions
as follows:
§ 1257. State courts; appeal; certiorari
Final judgments or decrees rendered by highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States
is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exer-
cised under, the United States.
Id. See also Sup. CT. R. 10-23 (describing the factors considered by the Court in determining
whether or not review should be granted).
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sion in favor of a federal right, the Supreme Court may take jurisdic-
tion at its discretion. 30 If it is obvious from a state court opinion that
the decision was based on adequate state law grounds independent of
federal law, then the Court has no jurisdiction.31
For the most part, the Court has found a potential for "problems"
only when a state court bases its decision on both federal and state
grounds, or does not make clear the basis of its decision. 2 Historically,
when dealing with a state court opinion ambiguous as to its grounds of
decision, the Supreme Court has adhered to the adequate state grounds
doctrine as developed in Murdock and other early cases.3 3 When the
record has failed to indicate whether the state court judgment was
based on federal or state law, the Court would decline jurisdiction if the
state law ground was adequate to support the decision.3 4
While the Court did not handle all adequate state grounds cases pre-
cisely in the same manner, it consistently declined to enter a premature
decision in any of them. After declining jurisdiction, 35 the Court was
free to dispose of these cases in a variety of ways. The controlling rule
seems to have been to treat each case by the method deemed most ap-
propriate under the circumstances-giving full consideration to the in-
terests of justice.3 6 In some instances, the Court simply dismissed the
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982). Even though the Court may exercise certiorari jurisdiction
in such cases, until just recently it has seldom done so, finding instead that "[i]t is only where
rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of judicial cognizance, are being, or [are] about to be,
affected prejudicially" that there is an interest in the "exertion of the judicial power." Texas v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n. & R.R. Labor Bd., 258 U.S. 158, 162 (1922) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 139-144 and accompanying text (discussing the development of certiorari jurisdic-
tion).
31. The cases cited infra note 34 comprise a selection of decisions spread over this century,
all of which support the proposition that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over state law.
They also demonstrate the variety of treatments the Court has given cases that raise an adequate
state grounds question. For an argument that the Supreme Court can and should take jurisdic-
tion over questions of state law, see Matasar & Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Juris-
dictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 1291 (1986).
32. O'Connor, supra note 27, at 6. Interestingly, the Court only seems to find this combi-
nation of factors when the state court is upholding a federal right.
33. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-29
(1963).
34. See, e.g., Board of Fairfax County v. Allman, 423 U.S. 940 (1975); Illinois v. Hudson,
405 U.S. 965 (1972); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n., 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965); Durley
v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 278 (1956); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 554 (1940);
Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U.S. 14, 18 (1937); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal
Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917); Adams v. Russell, 229 U.S. 353, 358 (1913); Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53 (1908).
35. See supra note 34.
36. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) (noting that the Court has altered its
approach "where justice seemed to require it").
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action.37 In some cases, it vacated and remanded to the state court, 38
and in others it continued the case while giving the state court an op-
portunity to clarify the basis of its decision. 39 In still other cases, the
Court reviewed the applicable state law in an attempt to ascertain
whether the decision rested on state or federal grounds.4° While this
approach has been described pejoratively as an "ad hoc" approach to
establishing the presence or absence of the Court's jurisdiction, 4' it
should not be considered as such. Rather, it should be viewed as a flexi-
ble approach allowing the Court to handle cases that require different
remedies. 42 In recent times, Madisonian federalism, carefully designed
to provide for the maximum individual liberty and freedom from op-
pressive government, 43 has given way to neofederalism. The widely
quoted discussion of federalism" put forward by Justice Black has been
adopted as the classical statement of neofederalist policy. Black be-
lieved that "the entire country is made up of a Union of Separate state
governments, the National Government will fare best if the states ...
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways. '"45 Black's comments deserve some consideration. 6
37. See, e.g., Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52 (1934); New York v. Atwell, 261 U.S. 590
(1923); Adams v. Russell, 229 U.S. 353 (1913).
38. See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
39. See Herb, 324 U.S. at 128.
40. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). This particular approach to the ade-
quate state grounds problem seems to have developed in recent years as the Court has strained to
find jurisdiction in cases it wishes to decide. It has culminated in the modern formulation of the
doctrine. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
41. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1039 (1983).
42. See Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100
H.4Rv. L. REV. 1485, 1496 (1987) (while the variety of approaches to the adequate state grounds
problem may not have a rational surface appearance, "[a]ll three [approaches taken together]
reflect a fairly consistent policy of avoiding jurisdiction based on speculation").
43. See supra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
44. Justice Black's definition is noteworthy because it has been quoted widely by others and
has received acceptance among current members of the Supreme Court, albeit with apparently
differing interpretations. Compare O'Connor, supra note 27, at 2-3 with Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
45. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
46. Some feel that Black's approach to federalism has been misunderstood and misapplied.
Minor Wisdom, senior judge from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, once
stated:
The New Federalism is not the federalism of the Framers. It would have shocked Ma-
dison and Hamilton. John Marshall could not have lived with it. It involves a recogni-
tion of states' rights that seems to extend beyond "Our Federalism" of Justice Black.
In spite of Younger, the New Federalism appears, at least to the writer, out of charac-
ter for Justice Black, who believed firmly in the doctrine of incorporation as the basis
for far-reaching incursions into state law.
Wisdom, supra note 22, at 1077.
Judge Wisdom is probably correct. In his famous discussion of federalism, Justice Black
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Under the dualistic federalism of Madison, state courts were the first
line of defense against incursions into individual liberties. However, if
litigants found-for any one of a variety of reasons-that they were
unable to obtain a fair hearing in state court, they could opt for the
federal system. The two systems acted as checks on each other, much as
the three branches of the federal government act as a system of checks
and balances.4 7 The purpose of maintaining dual avenues of judicial re-
view was to allow the federal courts to keep a watchful eye on state
courts. The federal courts acted, if necessary, to insure that state courts
adequately protected constitutional rights. 48 The neofederalism ex-
pressed by Justice Black in Younger and since articulated by the Court
in a host of similar decisions consists of the Supreme Court saying to
state courts: "we trust you"'49 to adjudicate federal rights fairly; we
therefore will not intervene. Madisonian federalism dictated a mutual
respect between the federal and state court systems; even though their
respective powers were separate they acted concurrently. However, it
also recognized that the state and federal court systems often would be
acting out of different interests50 The word "respect," when spoken in
conjunction with federalism, does not connote a chummy relation-
ship. " It is often more synonymous with the respect that adversaries
have for each other as they strive to achieve independent, and some-
said:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it
means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Govern-
ment and its courts . . . .What the concept does represent is a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added).
47. Dissenting in Younger, Justice Douglas articulated this more traditional view of federal-
ism by restating the words of Judge Will: "Section 1983 is, therefore, not only an expression of
the importance of protecting federal rights from infringement by the states but also, where nec-
essary, the desire to place the national government between the state and its citizens." Younger,
401 U.S. at 63. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 223 (N.D.
Ill. 1968)). Justice Douglas understood that the interests of the state and federal courts were not
always in harmony. He saw a role for federalism in the Court's decisions only to the extent that
it was structured so as to provide the greatest degree of protection to the people.
48. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
49. See generally Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need For
Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 193 (explaining the unreasonable assumptions underlying
the rule of Younger v. Harris).
50. "The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the
people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes." THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 46, supra note 12, at 322.
51. According to Madison, promoting "opposite and rival interests" infused the new gov-
ernment with the "defect of better motives." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 18, at 350.
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times conflicting, goals. True federalist respect is tempered with watch-
fulness.
Recent decisions articulating the neofederalist position have shut off
the opportunity to opt out of the state court system to an alternative
avenue of relief. Contrary to true federalism, neofederalism operates
under the assumption that the state and federal systems share the same
goals and can therefore function in complete harmony. The abstention
doctrine is one of the many neofederalist procedural devices developed
by the Court to erect a barrier between litigants and federal courts. Col-
lectively these devices act to insulate from federal review many state
court decisions that may be in violation of federal rights. When the
option of federal review is eliminated, the delicate system of federalist
checks and balances developed by the framers is disrupted. Ultimately,
individual liberties suffer. In discussing the relationship between the
federal and state governments, Madison said, "The adversaries of the
Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their
reasoning on this subject." 52
Contrary to-but curiously consistent with-policies like the ones de-
veloping out of Younger, the Court began in the middle 1970s to extend
its jurisdictional reach, often finding an absence of state law grounds
adequate to prevent it from taking jurisdiction. 3 It was then that
"problems" began to develop in the adequate state grounds doctrine.
This more expansive jurisdictional policy ultimately led to an embar-
rassing result in South Dakota v. Neville.14 In Neville, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota held that introducing evidence of the defen-
dant's refusal to take a sobriety test violated his right against self-
incrimination. The decision was based on both the South Dakota State
Constitution and the Federal Constitution. The United States Supreme
Court assumed jurisdiction in the case, in spite of the fact that it had
been decided on an independent and adequate state ground,5 reversing
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 12, at 322.
53. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987) (sixth amendment); Pennsylvania v. Finley,
107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987) (fourth amendment); Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdale, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (sixth
amendment); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (fourth amendment); Caldwell v. Missis-
sippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (eighth amendment); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
(fourth amendment); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (fifth amendment); Florida v.
Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984) (fourth amendment); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)
(fourth amendment); Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984) (fourth amendment); California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (eighth amendment); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
(fourth amendment).
54. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
55. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), rev'd, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). Early in its
opinion, after discussing a state statute and two state supreme court decisions, the state court
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the state court decision and remanding the case. On remand from the
United States Supreme Court, the South Dakota Supreme Court de-
clined to follow the Supreme Court's opinion, reciting instead a state-
ment that its original decision had been based on an independent and
adequate state law ground.16 The outcome of the case was determined
by the South Dakota Supreme Court, not by the United States Supreme
Court, despite the United States Supreme Court's efforts to the con-
trary. Following Neville, the Court understandably saw the need to
clarify its new jurisdictional approach. An opportunity to do so soon
arrived (or was brought in especially for the occasion, depending on
your point of view).
In Terry v. Ohio5 7 the Supreme Court authorized protective searches
for weapons based on a police officer's reasonable articulable suspi-
cion. Michigan v. Long 8 involved a situation in which police officers
extended an ostensibly protective search into the passenger compart-
ment of a car.5 9 The Michigan Supreme Court found the search "in this
held that defendant Neville's treatment by the state had violated his "federal and state constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 725 (citing U.S. CoNsr. amend. V; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 9). The remainder of the opinion appears to be dicta. The Supreme Court,
however, was not willing to accept the opinion on its face.
The Court also displayed its short institutional memory. Only a few years earlier in State v.
Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976), the South Dakota Supreme Court had indicated to the
United States Supreme Court that it viewed its state constitution as entirely independent of the
Federal Constitution: "We have always assumed the independent nature of our state constitution
.... .Id. at 674. The court also noted that it "was under no compulsion to follow the United
States Supreme Court in that regard." Id. The court then proceeded to grant defendant Opper-
man greater rights under the state constitution than the United States Supreme Court had been
willing to grant him under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 674-75. See South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (search of defendant Opperman's vehicle was not unreasonable), rev'g
State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975), on remand, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
56. State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984). Noting that the Supreme Court did not
read its original opinion as resting on an independent state ground, the court cited Opperman for
the proposition that it had the power to act independent of the Supreme Court. The court fur-
ther stated, "While the Supreme Court determined that evidence of an accused's refusal to take
a blood test does not infringe upon Fifth Amendment rights, their decision is not controlling of
our decision herein." Id. at 427 (emphasis added). The court then proceeded, as in Opperman,
to grant the defendant greater rights under the state constitution than the Supreme Court had
been willing to under the Federal Constitution. Id.
57. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
58. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Long is often erroneously considered the case in which the Court
established its neofederalist approach to the adequate state grounds question. It is important
because it is the first case in which the neofederalist approach is fully articulated. However, the
neofederalist approach was evident in a number of cases that preceded Long. See, e.g., Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977).
59. Long, 463 U.S. at 1035-36. It seems doubtful that the search could have been for pur-
poses of self-protection in view of the fact that defendant Long had already left the car and was
some distance away.
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case" unjustified. 6° Even though the Michigan court's opinion was con-
sistent with then existing interpretations of United States Supreme
Court decisions construing the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court
took the opportunity to extend the reach of Terry-type searches. More
significantly, in Long the Court chose to expound on its new jurisdic-
tional policy. The Court announced that when faced with a state court
decision, ambiguous as to whether or not it was decided on the basis of
federal or state law, the Court will presume it has jurisdiction. 61 If the
opinion from the state court does not contain a "plain statement ' 62
that the case was decided on independent and adequate state grounds,
the Court operates under the assumption that the federal question was
controlling-whether in fact it was, or not. 61
The Court is no longer willing to defer to a state court's judgment on
questions of state law 64 where a state court's judgment does not fall
beneath the federally prescribed minimum. 65 In recent years, the Court
has seen fit to alter a number of such state court decisions. 66 The ade-
60. Id. at 1037. This is significant because it indicates that in order to reach its conclusion
regarding the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court overturned a state court's factual determi-
nation.
61. Id. at 1042. The Court actually uses the word "assume." Most commentators feel that
there is little difference between assuming jurisdiction and presuming jurisdiction. See, e.g., Alt-
house, supra note 42, at 1493; Seid, Schizoid Federalism, Supreme Court Power and Inadequate
Adequate State Ground Theory: Michigan v. Long, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 10 (1984); Note,
Ohio v. Johnson: The Continuing Demise of the Adequate and Independent State Ground Rule,
57 U. CoLo. L. REV. 395, 396 (1986) (referring to the Court's action in Long as a presumption of
jurisdiction) [hereinafter Note, Ohio v. Johnson]; Note, State Constitutions Realigning Federal-
ism: A Special Look At Florida, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 733, 749 (1987) [hereinafter Note, State
Constitutions]. But see Schlueter, Judicial Federalism And Supreme Court Review of State
Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1092 (1984) (argu-
ing that the word presumption is an incorrect portrayal of the Court's policy).
62. Long, 463 U.S. at 1042.
63. Cases like Neville and Opperman clearly indicate that there has been little concern for
accuracy in the Court's recent observations on the existence or nonexistence of controlling state
law grounds. See also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013 (1983) (holding that the Court
would defer to the state on the issue at hand, but reversing the California Supreme Court), on
remand, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S.
667, 671 (1982) (stating that the Oregon appellate court's decision rested on federal law, even
though it was based in part "on state statutory and constitutional grounds"), on remand, 295
Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1982) (since the
Washington Supreme Court repeatedly cited United States Supreme Court decisions and made
no reference to the applicable Washington statute, its decision was not based on independent
state grounds), on remand, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
64. The curiosity of Younger is apparent. On one hand, the Supreme Court is saying that it
trusts state courts to decide questions of federal law; on the other hand, in Long it is saying that
it does not trust state courts to decide questions of either federal or state law.
65. Justice Stevens asserted this position in Long, 463 U.S. at 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For the majority response, see id. at 1042-43 n.8.
66. See supra note 53.
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quate state grounds doctrine has been a powerful vehicle for achieving
that end.
In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, it is difficult to establish from the
record that the current Court is concerned with federalist principles at
all. The results of cases, as distinguished from the dicta they contain,
reflect no particular interest in clarifying the state-federal relationship.
Rather, they imply a strong interest in deferring to governmental
power. 67 It makes little difference whether it is a federal, state or local
government asserting itself over the people. 68 The modern formulation
of the adequate state grounds doctrine gives us a different perspective
on Younger v. Harris and those cases expressing the tenents of neofed-
eralism. The Supreme Court is saying to the state courts, "we trust
you," 69 but like the trust that flows from parent to child, the trust that
flows from the Court to the states is paternalistic. Actually, the Court
seems to be saying: "We trust you only so long as you do what we want
you to do."
The Court's present approach to adequate state grounds cases is in-
consistent with the respect accorded state courts under true federalism, 70
the purpose of which was to provide the greatest degree of protection
possible to individual rights. Neither is it consistent with the ideals of
neofederalism expressed in the ill-advised Younger decision. 7' Rather
than an expression of trust for state courts, the Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated a policy that treats state courts as stepchildren. Curiously
enough, while antithetical to neofederalist decisions like Younger which
grant state courts greater freedom, the new adequate state grounds doc-
trine is consistent with those decisions in its practical result. That is, it
acts to the detriment of the individual seeking to assert a constitutional
right 72
The basic proposition of this Comment is that the Court's present
formulation of the adequate state grounds doctrine is ill-advised, that it
should be abandoned and that the Court should return to previous
67. When the Supreme Court uses the adequate state grounds doctrine to narrowly interpret
a federal right, all citizens lose their ability to assert that right in all courts: federal, state and
local.
68. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express Inc., v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (defer-
ring to corporate power); United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, on remand, 828 F.2d 1498
(1 1th Cir. 1987) (deferring to federal power); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (defer-
ring to local power); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (deferring to state power).
69. See generally Laycock, supra note 49.
70. Under true federalism this respect was ultimately derived from the fact that the states
are inherently closer to the people than the federal government ever will be. See generally THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 23.
71. See generally Laycock, supra note 49.
72. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
1988] ADEQUATE& INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS 377
methods of handling ambiguously decided cases. A secondary proposi-
tion is that the Court should usually refrain from taking jurisdiction
over state court decisions that uphold an asserted federal right. Beyond
the concerns of federalism there are several other factors that support a
change in the Court's current jurisdictional policy.
II. OTHER PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES UNDERLYING THE ADEQUATE
STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE
The Court's current neofederalist approach to the adequate state
grounds doctrine is not based on a truly federalist motivation; rather, it
stands in opposition to the principles of federalism. The original formu-
lation of the adequate state grounds doctrine was solidly based in feder-
alist principles.73 What, then, are the factors that motivate the Court's
present position?
Traditionally, aside from serving the interests of federalism, the ade-
quate state grounds doctrine has served many important purposes. The
doctrine has provided a substantial aid to judicial efficiency by limiting
access to the Court's crowded docket,74 and it has provided the Court
with the flexibility necessary to deal with varying factual histories and
procedural postures of individual cases.75 Neither of these purposes are
served by the neofederalist position. Presuming jurisdiction does not
assist docket control, 76 nor does it offer flexibility. Two other justifica-
tions have been promoted as foundations for the modern formulation
of the adequate state grounds doctrine-the avoidance of unconstitu-
tional advisory opinions and the interest in protecting the uniformity of
federal law.
73. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
74. Chief Justice Rehnquist, a supporter of the Court's new jurisdictional doctrine, has
stated in an argument for a new federal appellate court: "The present proliferation of litigation
in both state and federal courts throughout the country and the tremendously increased number
of undecided federal questions which this litigation raises are presently preventing the Supreme
Court from adequately discharging its role . . ." Rehnquist, The Changing Role Of The Su-
preme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 14 (1986). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1070 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Our] docket [is] swollen with requests by States to reverse
judgments that their courts have rendered in favor of their citizens.").
75. Flexibility is an absolute necessity for a Court concerned with vindicating the rights of
individuals. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe primary role of [the]
Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard.")
(emphasis in original). However, this is not as important for a Court that is primarily concerned
with the rights of only 50 individuals (the states), whose institutional interests are much the
same.
76. In terms of limiting the number of cases on the docket, presuming jurisdiction does not
help. It can, however, serve as a mechanism for insuring that the kinds of cases the Court wants
to hear are available for disposition.
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A. The Avoidance of Advisory Opinions
An important purpose underlying the original adequate state grounds
doctrine has been the avoidance of unconstitutional advisory opinions.
It has also been asserted as a basis for the neofederalist version of that
doctrine. 77 It is well established that the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction to decide questions of state law.7 1 What happens, then,
when the Supreme Court takes jurisdiction over a state court decision-
as it did in Long and has in many later cases-operating under a pre-
sumption that the case was decided on federal grounds? If the case was
originally decided on state grounds and the state court, following Su-
preme Court review, enters a final decision contrary to that of the Su-
preme Court, has the Supreme Court entered an advisory opinion? In
order to answer this question the term "advisory opinion" must first be
defined .79
The ban on advisory opinions derives from the article III case or con-
troversy requirement.80 The framers included this requirement to effec-
tuate their intent that the Supreme Court not be a general expositor of
public policy. The Court was not to be "in the business of emitting
free-floating legal advice,"'" but rather was to be the ultimate decider
of cases and controversies. A leading case on the subject, Muskrat v.
U.S., 2 established several criteria useful in defining "advisory opin-
ion." In Muskrat, the Court stated that the exercise of power to make
constitutional decisions "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controv-
ers[ies]. ' '83 While many other factors can influence the rendering of an
77. Justice Stevens eloquently addressed this assertion when he said: "I am thoroughly baf-
fled by the Court's suggestion that it must stretch its jurisdiction and reverse the judgment[s] of
[State] Supreme Court[s] in order to show '[riespect for the independence of state courts."'
Long, 463 U.S. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting ante at 1040).
78. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
79. The principle that the Supreme Court can not render advisory opinions was originally
stated in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 409, 410 (1792); See also Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911) (discussing Hayburn).
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S.
375, 382-83 (1980); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 96 (1968); Liner v. Jafco Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 480 (1923). In these cases the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of case
and controversy and the effect of mootness on federal jurisdiction.
81. See Althouse, supra note 42, at 1492.
82. 219U.S. 346(1911).
83. Id. at 359 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)) (emphasis added). The Court further states, "Judicial power ... is the power of a court
to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who
bring a case before it for decision." Id. at 356 (quotirng S.F. Miller, The Judicial Power of the
United States, in LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (1891)).
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advisory opinion, 4 emphasis here is on words indicating that, to avoid
rendering an advisory opinion, the Court's interest should be in "deter-
mining" the outcome of cases. Since the Court instituted its policy of
presuming jurisdiction over ambiguous state court decisions, there have
been several instances where the Supreme Court decision has not deter-
mined the outcome.85 In every ambiguously decided case in which the
Court has presumed jurisdiction, it has been within the power of the
state court on remand to control the outcome of the case simply by
stating that its original decision rested on independent and adequate
state grounds.16 In most instances where the Supreme Court has pre-
sumed jurisdiction over a case that was ambiguously decided, the state
court has deferred to the Supreme Court judgment and entered a deci-
sion consistent with it.87 However, state courts are not required to do
so. In other instances, state courts have been unwilling to accept the
Supreme Court's advice and have reversed" the Court's decisions, bas-
ing their final decisions on state grounds and indicating that they had
done so in their original decisions.8 9
The reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the Court should only
involve itself in cases it can decide also leads to the conclusion that
when it fails to do so, the Court risks entering an advisory opinion.
Arguably, the Court enters an advisory opinion in every such case, with
state courts choosing to follow its advice in some instances but not in
others. Those cases in which the state court chooses not to follow the
Supreme Court's advice serve as evidence that all such opinions are ad-
visory. The Court has indicated that an opinion which would subject
the Court's decision to "consideration and suspension" by an outside
body would amount to an advisory opinion.90 The Court strongly main-
84. One such factor is the lack of adversity between the parties. Friendly or collusive suits
present the best example of this situation. See Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850).
85. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553 (1983).
86. See State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984). The Supreme Court has established
that state courts can maintain the independence of their decisions and avoid Supreme Court
review by making a simple statement to this effect. It is unclear why the contemporary Court
refuses to recognize that such a statement made on remand following Supreme Court review is
equally effective to maintain the independence of the state court decision-nullifying any Su-
preme Court influence in the case.
87. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983).
88. See Note, Ohio v. Johnson, supra note 61, at 409 ("few state courts are willing to take
the bold step of 'reversing' a decree of the United States Supreme Court"). See also Robson &
Mello, Ariadne's Provisions For Returning Alive From the Labyrinth of Federalism, 76 CALIF.
L. REV. 89, 122-23 (1988).
89. See supra note 63.
90. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1911) (quoting Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
(2 Dal.) 409 (1792)).
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tains that its decisions should be final and not subject to review.91
Clearly, in cases like those discussed above, the Court's decision is not
"final." 92 Even in those cases in which the state court agrees with the
Supreme Court, on remand it is the state court that controls the out-
come by submitting the Supreme Court's decision to "consideration
and suspension" until it enters the "final" decision in the case. The
distinction between cases that are based on an adequate state ground
and the usual remand is that in the typical case remanded to another
court, the Supreme Court has the power to enter the final decision, but
voluntarily surrenders that authority to the lower court. When the Su-
preme Court takes jurisdiction in a case like Neville, which was decided
on an independent and adequate state ground, the Court does not, and
cannot voluntarily relinquish control over the case's outcome. When a
case is decided on an adequate state ground, the Supreme Court has no
control over its outcome because it has no jurisdiction93 and, therefore,
no control to relinquish to the state court.
When the Supreme Court presumes jurisdiction over a state court
case decided on ambiguous grounds, it trusts the state court to accept
its advice. Whether the state court accepts the offered advice or not, the
Court's expositions on federal law in such a case are merely advisory
since they are not determinative of the case's outcome.
Explaining the purpose of the adequate state grounds doctrine, the
Court in Herb v. Pitcairn94 stated:
[Olur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We
are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its
views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than
an advisory opinion. 95
91. Id. at 352-53.
92. Id.
93. The definition of jurisdiction is power. See supra note 83. The Supreme Court by virtue
of the supremacy clause has the power to call up a case like Neville for review. In that sense, it
has jurisdiction. But it does not have the power to decide cases like Neville. In that sense, it has
no jurisdiction. The assertion of this Comment is that the power to enter binding decisions con-
stitutes jurisdiction, not the power to talk.
The question involved relates to the effect of the proceedings had in a court wholly
incompetent to render a valid judgment, because if the judgment to be rendered would
be void it necessarily follows the preliminary proceedings of the court, necessary to
rendition of judgment, must likewise be void. If the court has no jurisdiction of the
subject matter for judgment there can be no jurisdiction giving effect to process or
pleadings.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 122 n.2 (1945).
94. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
95. Id. at 126.
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It seems clear that the precise result predicted in Herb has occurred.
Until the Court either decides to alter its present approach to ambi-
guously decided cases or is embarrassed into doing so by a state court,
its opinions in adequate state grounds cases will be regarded by many as
merely advisory.9 Amazingly, the majority has cited the language in
Herb on a regular basis in a transparent attempt to persuade skeptical
critics that it has adhered to the legal principles involved in that case.
97
"A legal fiction is an assumption by the law that a statement is true
when everybody knows it to be false." 9 Too many commentators re-
main unpersuaded that the Court does not render advisory opinions un-
der the current adequate state grounds doctrine for the idea to pass
even as a legal fiction. 99 Prior to the Long decision, the Court seldom
saw the need to express its concern over the possibility of rendering an
advisory opinion in the context of an adequate state grounds question.
As the Court noted in Herb, the avoidance of advisory opinions is the
obvious basis for the doctrine and has seldom been considered to re-
quire comment by the Court. 100
In other contexts, the remotest possibility that the Court might ren-
der an advisory opinion has controlled its disposition of the case. Curi-
ously enough, Younger abstention is one of the areas in which the
Court has expressed this concern. In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 10 the
Court stated:
Another important reason for [Younger] abstention is to avoid
unwarranted determination of federal constitutional questions. When
federal courts interpret state statutes in a way that raises federal
constitutional questions, "a constitutional determination is predicated
on a reading of the statute that is not binding on state courts and may
96. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). It has recently been argued that the
Court's decisions are binding only on the parties to a given case and only with regard to the facts
of that case. In view of such attacks it seems unwise for the Court to enter advisory opinions
that are subject to attack on the grounds that they do not even bind the parties to the suit. See
Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TULANE L. REV. 979, 987 (1987).
97. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984).
98. H. WIcox, FALLACIES OF THE LAW 88 (1907).
99. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 42, at 1506; Elison and NettikSimmons, supra note 1, at
200; Seid, supra note 61, at 26; Welsh, Reconsidering The Constitutional Relationship Between
State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1118, 1140
(1984); Note, Ohio v. Johnson, supra note 61, at 416; Note, State Law Independence and The
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine After Michigan v. Long, 62 WASH. U.L.Q.
547, 568 (1984). Contra Schlueter, supra note 61, at 1101; Matasar & Bruch, supra note 31, at
570.
100. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
101. 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987).
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be discredited at any time-thus essentially rendering the federal-court
decision advisory and the litigation underlying it meaningless." 0 2
From the Supreme Court's perspective it is easy to see why, in some
contexts, the danger of entering an advisory opinion should be a signifi-
cant consideration. The Court reasons that the ban on advisory opi-
nions is required by the supremacy clause of the Constitution.'0 3
Constitutional violations on the part of the Court, designated as the
ultimate arbiter of constitutional questions,' °4 are indeed disconcerting
and unseemly. It is unclear why the Court applies the case or contro-
versy clause so stringently in some situations and ignores it in others.
How can the Court logically find the abstention doctrine is required by
article III-because of the danger of advisory opinions-while disre-
garding advisory opinions that occur in the adequate state grounds con-
text? What distinguishes an advisory opinion in an adequate state
grounds setting from the possibility of an advisory opinion in any other
context?
In most situations where the Court has found circumstances that dic-
tate against assuming jurisdiction because of the danger of an advisory
opinion, the Court is called on to vindicate a federal right.'05 Applica-
tion of the ban on advisory opinions eliminates the possibility of doing
so. When the Court presumes jurisdiction over an ambiguously decided
criminal case there is no opportunity to vindicate an individual right.
The defendants in these cases were winners at the state court level.0°6
These cases present only an opportunity either to narrow or eliminate
federal rights, since the Court cannot assist the defendants by taking
jurisdiction.
B. The Interest In Uniformity
Today's Supreme Court cites the interest in promoting uniformity of
federal law'0 7 as the rationale behind its assuming jurisdiction over am-
102. Id. at 1526 (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 428 (1979)).
103. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1042 (1983) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945)).
104. See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
105. Opportunities to narrow the scope of federal rights are not presented in these cases
except, of course, the right of access to the courts.
106. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
107. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039. The Court described its previous methods of handling cases
under the adequate state grounds doctrine as "antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is
required when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved. . . .[Wie therefore deter-
mine that it is appropriate to reexamine our treatment of this jurisdictional issue in order to
achieve the consistency that is necessary." Id. (emphasis added). Finally the Court stated that
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biguous state court decisions involving what it considers to be errone-
ous interpretations of federal law. As a justification for presuming
jurisdiction over ambiguously decided cases, uniformity-like the
Court's other justifications for its approach to adequate state grounds
cases-is at odds with other neofederalist policies. Uniformity of fed-
eral law is, in appropriate situations, an admirable goal. The principle
behind uniformity of law is equal protection of the laws. Justice
O'Connor, who has authored many of the Court's adequate state
grounds opinions, has stated:
These basic facts about our judicial federalism indicate the need for
some means to assure a consistent and uniform body of federal law
.... The goal of natiorfal uniformity rests on a fundamental
principle: that a single sovereign's laws should be applied equally to
all-a principle expressed by the phrase, "Equal Justice Under Law,"
inscribed over the great doors to the United States Supreme Court. 0 8
Uniformity of law encompasses the idea that one person should not
suffer a greater burden under the law than another, °9 simply because
dismissal of such cases is inappropriate
because it cannot be doubted that there is an important need for uniformity of federal
law, and that this need goes unsatisfied when we fail to review an opinion that rests
primarily upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged state ground
is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion.
Id. at 1040.
108. O'Connor, supra note 27, at 4. This principle is widely accepted. The California State
Constitution contained a provision that read in pertinent part: "All laws of a general nature
shall have a uniform operation." CAL CONSr. OF 1849, art. I, § 11. Not surprisingly, this provi-
sion was interpreted by the California Supreme Court as an equal protection provision. See De-
partment of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 754, 329 P.2d 689, 699 (1958);
Lelande v. Lowery, 26 Cal. 2d 224, 232, 157 P.2d 639, 645 (1945); San Bernadino v. Way, 18
Cal. 2d 647, 658, 117 P.2d 354, 361 (1941). This definition of the meaning of the California
uniformity provision was, of course, accepted by the United States Supreme Court. See Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965). See also National Tea Co. v. State,
205 Minn. 443, 286 N.W. 360 (1939), vacated, 309 U.S. 551 (stating that the Minnesota Supreme
Court had erroneously attempted to base its decision on the fourteenth amendment), reinstated,
208 Minn. 607, 294 N.W. 230 (1940) (interpreting MINN. Co NsT. art. 10, § 1, which stated that
"taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects," as the equivalent of an equal protec-
tion provision) (emphasis added).
109. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816), the Court stated:
A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for state
tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive
is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole
United States . . . There is an additional consideration, which is entitled to great
weight. The constitution of the United States was designed for the common and equal
benefit of all the people of the United States.
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that person lives in a different state,"0 or for some other irrational rea-
son."' The neofederalist adequate state grounds doctrine perverts that
principle. Rather than lifting everyone to the same level, as does the
true principle of uniformity, the neo-federalist adequate state grounds
doctrine seeks to bring everyone down to the same level, so that all
rights suffer equally from the same lack of protection.
In the context of inadequate state grounds decisions, the Court has
encouraged state experimentation and independence from federal law.
When litigants raise claims involving state "experiments" that have run
afoul of the Constitution, their access to the federal courts is limited by
a wide range of neofederalist procedural devices." 2 This contrasts with
the typical adequate state grounds case which usually involves the up-
holding of an asserted federal right by a state court. In that situation,
rather than limiting access to the federal courts, the Supreme Court as-
sumes it has jurisdiction and reverses the state court decision-or at
least tries to persuade the state court to do so.
Oddly enough, while the Court asserts uniformity as the basis for the
adequate state grounds doctrine, the doctrine itself is not applied in a
uniform fashion. The adequate state grounds doctrine, like federalism,
actually exists in a strange dualistic form. This article focuses on the
substantive adequate state grounds doctrine. As a doctrine, it attempts
to answer the question: when is substantive state law of such sufficient
importance to a decision that it bars Supreme Court review? There is
also a procedural adequate state grounds doctrine"3 which is only pe-
ripherally a subject of this article. This procedural branch of the ade-
quate state grounds doctrine is commonly referred to as procedural
default."4 The reference to default means what it implies; that the per-
110. "Judges . . . in different states, might differently interpret . . . the constitution itself: if
there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmo-
nize them into uniformity . . . the constitution of the United States would be different, in differ-
ent states..." Id. at 348.
111. "The public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplora-
ble . . . . The judicial power was granted for the same benign and salutary purposes. It was not
to be exercised exclusively for the benefit of . . . plaintiffs . . . but also for the protection of
defendants .... " Id.
112. The abstention doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is one
such device.
113. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443
(1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
114. Technically, the procedural strand of the adequate state grounds doctrine involves only
cases on direct review to the Supreme Court. Procedural default involves cases in the lower
federal courts. These cases, like the adequate state grounds cases, usually begin in state courts.
However, it is possible for a federal defendant to be in procedural default. In any case, the issue
presented in both procedural default and the procedural strand of the adequate state grounds
doctrine is the same: when will a failure to comply with a procedural rule bar further review in
the federal courts? Since this article advocates melding the two doctrines, they are referred to
interchangeably.
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son in default loses. The procedural adequate state grounds doctrine
attempts to answer the question: when will a party be blocked from
federal review" 5 by its failure to comply with a state rule of proce-
dure?" 6 The Court has answered the first question by presuming juris-
diction on behalf of state prosecutors who are attempting to deny a
federal right. It has answered the second question by denying jurisdic-
tion where an individual is seeking to have a federal right protected.
Under the procedural adequate state grounds doctrine the Court has
found that the interest in preserving a state procedural rule can out-
weigh the fact that a federal right has been denied-even though the
result is non-uniformity of federal rights.' 17 'Thus rights may be denied
even though the result is non-uniformity. On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court has found that state courts should grant federal rights
only when they are in uniformity with Supreme Court opinions. Why is
uniformity important to the Court when the states extend broad rights
under the Federal Constitution, but not important when federal rights
are being denied?"' The answer lies in the practical results obtained un-
der both doctrines-the denial of individual liberties.
115. While this is important in other contexts, the substantive adequate state grounds doc-
trine is most visible in cases that involve direct review by the Supreme Court of state court
decisions. Unlike the substantive adequate state grounds doctrine, procedural default is most
commonly encountered in the lower federal courts.
116. A close relative of the procedural adequate state grounds doctrine is the collateral bar
rule which applies in both procedural and substantive circumstances. The effect of the collateral
bar rule is to deny the right to raise constitutional issues in federal court where the litigant has
deliberately failed to comply with a court order and is charged with criminal contempt. See
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). This rule is primarily based on the belief
that if litigants fail to comply with court orders there can be no rule of law. Thus, it is distin-
guishable from the procedural adequate state grounds doctrine in that it has a sound theoretical
basis. The rule from Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), that relief could only be denied if the
defendant had "deliberately by-passed" a state procedural rule, is very close to the collateral bar
rule. But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (applying a cause and prejudice test).
117. Claims of procedural default-that a claim should be barred from federal review be-
cause of an adequate and independent state procedural ground-are presented by state officials
to attack federal court jurisdiction collaterally. In criminal cases, the state official in question is
the state prosecutor. In this situation the Court does not presume jurisdiction. After an initial
showing by the prosecutor that the state has adequate and independent interests in requiring
compliance with its procedural rule, the burden shifts to the criminal defendant to show "cause
for the noncompliance and some showing of actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitu-
tional violation." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977). "The adequacy of such an inde-
pendent state procedural ground . . . has been treated very differently than where the state-law
ground is substantive." Id. at 82. In the substantive area the prosecutor who has lost in state
court raises the adequate state grounds doctrine. In those cases the Court presumes jurisdiction.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). So much for uniformity.
118. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). "The governmental power
to interfere . . . with . . . rights . . . is not unlimited, and . . . [a] restriction cannot be imposed
if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
Id.
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III. DEMOCRACY, UNIFORMITY, AND INDIViDuAL RIGHTS
To some extent, the concepts of federalism, democracy and unifor-
mity of law are intertwined in the adequate state grounds area and can-
not be viewed independently. The concept of federalism raises the
question of what rights legitimately belong to the states, as opposed to
the federal government, and to any government as opposed to the peo-
ple. Under a democratic system of government "by the people," the
various governments-federal, state or local-have rights only insofar
as they seek to act on behalf of their respective citizens."19
The governmental interest in uniformity of federal law is a legitimate
the government's and powerful interest, stemming from constitutional
responsibility to provide the citizenry with equal protection of the laws.
When any branch or level of government acts to provide its citizens
with equal protection, it acts under a constitutional duty vested in the
government by the citizenry. Therefore, the citizenry are the source and
ultimate repository of that right; and the government's right is charac-
terized more appropriately as a responsibility.20
An additional right that, appropriately or not, has been characterized
as a state's right is the police power.' 2' The state acts under its police
power to provide for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. 2 2
Again, this is not a right that stands independent of the people; rather,
it exists only when the state acts with their consent-given legisla-
tively-and on their behalf. Police power, therefore, can be viewed
more appropriately as a responsibility, much in the same way that equal
protection can be viewed as a responsibility. 23
Viewed from this perspective, only one set of circumstances where
the interest in uniformity of law (equal protection of the law) legiti-
mately justifies taking jurisdiction over state court decisions that do not
hold against an asserted federal right. That situation is when the state
legislature or other state agency, acting on legislative authority, has
acted under its police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare
119. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533 (1934). It is only when property or activity
is "affected with a public interest" that it becomes "subject to ... the police power." Id.
120. "[Ilt is not only the right, but the . . . solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety,
happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every
act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends . Id. at 523 (quoting
New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837)).
121. Id. It is interesting to note that while state police power is well-documented in judge
made case law, it has no explicit basis in the Constitution.
122. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Central Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Mayo v.
Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940); Nebbia, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526
(1917).
123. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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of its citizens, and a state court has invalidated the state action through
a misinterpretation of federal law.
There is a foreseeable argument that this is precisely what the Su-
preme Court does under the neofederalist version of the adequate state
grounds doctrine. The Court takes jurisdiction over criminal cases on
behalf of states which exercise their police power in the form of prose-
cutions. The Court acts to "assist" the state prosecutors' efforts to pro-
tect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry by helping the
prosecutor keep criminals off the streets. This argument, however, as-
sumes that a Supreme Court acting as assistant state prosecutor is a
desirable objective.
The Court's approach to what it describes as uniformity under the
adequate state grounds doctrine is antithetical to the interests of true
federalism. It is an interest not in assisting the state but in asserting
federal control over the state police power; 24 in that sense it is at odds
even with neofederalism. In such an instance, the Court's policy places
direct limitations on the application of the Constitution to the lives of
individuals. Rather than assisting the states in doing so, the Court steps
into cases where the states clearly do not want to limit individual rights
and requires the states to impose limitations.
Consistent with the principles outlined, the Court should take juris-
diction over ambiguously decided cases only when the state court has
mistakenly upheld an asserted federal right against the state's attempt
to provide for its citizens. 25 Under these circumstances, the Supreme
Court should examine the state court decision under general equal pro-
tection principles. 126 The Court's interest in uniformity of law properly
lies in vindicating the equal protection interest of persons who would
normally benefit from states' attempts to provide for their health,
safety or welfare had it not been for the inappropriate intervention of
state courts. 127
In most instances where the state action involves only general social
or economic legislation, 28 the Supreme Court should uphold the state
action so long as there is a rational relationship between the state's goal
and its course of action. In such instances, the Court legitimately could
exercise its certiorari jurisdiction, ultimately holding against the as-
124. See Note, Ohio v. Johnson, supra note 61, at 410.
125. This is precisely what happened in Ives v. South Buffalo, 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431
(1911).
126. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (discus-
sion of equal protection principles).
127. Ives, 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431, for example, involved a state workmen's compensa-
tion law.
128. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
388 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:365
serted federal right and in favor of the citizenry's right to uniform
treatment under the law (equal protection). 1 29
Until 1914, the Court had no jurisdiction over state court decisions
holding in favor of an asserted federal right. 30 Ives v. South Buffalo'3 1
persuaded Congress of the Court's need for certiorari jurisdiction over
state court decisions. This case involved a situation in which the state
court struck down a far-reaching piece of social welfare legislation in-
tended to benefit large numbers of people,'3 2 ruling in favor of a prop-
erty interest asserted as a federal constitutional right.'33 Since the state
court decision was in favor of the asserted federal right, there was no
possibility of Supreme Court review. 34 The need for uniformity of fed-
eral law is the sole basis for Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over
state court decisions. 3 This important concern continues today; there
is always the possibility of an Ives type decision. For example, if a state
court were to hold incorrectly that affirmative action programs are per
se unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth amendment, 36 or that
a state workmen's compensation program is an unconstitutional taking
of property, "7 then the equal protection right to uniformity of law
would be violated. Occasionally, in such cases it may be most appropri-
ate for the Supreme Court to exercise discretion and delay jurisdiction
if the erroneous decision is subject to immediate revision by forces
within the state.' 3 The true spirit of comity dictates merely that there be
129. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.,
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Both are examples of situations in which the Court held
against an asserted constitutional right in favor of equal protection principles.
130. P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MIsmHIN & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECnSLER's THt FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 440 (2d ed. 1973).
131. 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
132. Ives, 201 N.Y. at 273, 94 N.E. at 433.
133. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which states in pertinent part: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." (empha-
sis added).
134. The Supreme Court did not have certiorari jurisdiction over state court decisions until
1914. It is only under certiorari, not on appeal, that the court can take jurisdiction when the
state court decides in favor of an asserted federal right.
135. The Court was without certiorari jurisdiction for many years. But for cases such as Ives
v. South Buffalo, 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), that present uniformity problems, there will
always be no need for certiorari jurisdiction.
136. While such programs can violate equal protection principles under certain circum-
stances, see University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), they are not by any means
per se unconstitutional.
137. See Ives, 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431.
138. The ultimate result of Ives provides a good example of such a development. Following
the decision in Ives, New York adopted a state constitutional amendment barring any construc-
tion by the courts of the state constitution that would "limit the power of the legislature to enact
laws for the protection of the lives, health, or safety of employees." N.Y. CoNsT. of 1894, art. I,
§ 19 (1913) (current version at N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 18).
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courteous relations between the federal and state governments. Comity
does not dictate the sacrifice of individual liberties that seems to be re-
quired by neofederalism.13 9 Comity is only one small aspect of true du-
alistic federalism. When no evidence indicates that the state will take
quick action to vindicate the equal protection injury, the federal courts
must be prepared to step in and fill the breach. It is important for the
Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over such cases because of the indi-
vidual rights at stake; certiorari jurisdiction was created for that reason.
Conversely, when a state court chooses to extend greater constitu-
tional protections to a criminal defendant than provided by the United
States Supreme Court, no such interest exists.' 4° There is no denial of
equal protection. Without an interest in equal protection, there is no
interest in uniformity.' 4' On the other hand, it is arguable that the crim-
inal defendant is denied equal protection under the neofederalist ade-
quate state grounds doctrine, since the Supreme Court applies its
presumption of jurisdiction on a selective basis.
When the Supreme Court takes jurisdiction over an ambiguous state
court decision in which the state court has granted more extensive rights
to a criminal defendant than the Supreme Court would prefer,' 42 the
Court protects the interests of the state prosecutor. Acting under state
authority as a state officer, a prosecutor has no equal protection right
and, therefore, no interest in uniform application of the law. The four-
teenth amendment was intended to act as a direct limitation on state
authority.' 43 Therefore, the notion that the spirit driving the amend-
ment (equal protection) should be applied to augment assertions of
state power over individuals is ludicrous.
A. The Impact of the Court's Current Policy
A review of the scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state
court cases is helpful in understanding the impact of the Court's policy
139. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437 (1963) (noting that "the needs of comity are ade-
quately served in other ways"). See also Laycock, supra note 49.
140. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1030 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[W]hat
harm would have been done to the administration of justice by state courts, if the California
court had been left undisturbed in its determination." Id.
141. Id. This assumes, of course, and not unreasonably, that the terms equal protection and
uniformity are synonymous.
142. See, e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text.
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The words "no state shall" speak for themselves. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (discussing the
legislative history of the fourteenth amendment and the reconstruction era civil rights statutes).
That the fourteenth amendment and the reconstruction statutes were intended to be a "transfor-
mation from the concepts of federalism" to provide even broader rights than Madison envi-
sioned has been ignored by the current Court. Id. at 242.
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concerning the adequate state grounds doctrine. Under the Judiciary
Act, 1" the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all cases in which the
state court upholds a state action against an asserted federal right. 145
Thus, a state criminal defendant,' 6 or a litigant attempting to sue the
state for damages or injunction 47 has no use for the Court's presump-
tion of jurisdiction. As long as these parties assert a federal right and
that right is denied, they have the right of review in the United States
Supreme Court. 141 Should the Court find that the state has acted be-
neath the constitutionally prescribed minimum level, it is bound by the
supremacy clause to reverse the state court decision. 149 These rules hold
true as long as a federal right is asserted, regardless of whether the state
court decision is ambiguous.
Thus far, the examination of cases in which the state court clearly
decided against a federal right has shown that the person asserting that
right has no use for the Court's presumption of jurisdiction. But what
about persons who assert a federal right and win in state court? Prior
to recent changes in court policy, the Supreme Court rarely showed any
interest in such cases, even when a decision was based explicitly and
solely on a federal ground. 150 More importantly, if the state court held
for the criminal defendant on the basis of both a federal right and a
state right, or did not make clear the grounds for its decision, the Su-
preme Court refused to review the case on the basis that an independent
and adequate state ground could control the decision.
144. See supra note 29.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), (2) (1983).
146. Typically, the doctrine has been applied only against criminal defendants. See Capital
Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 466 U.S. 378 (1984), a noncriminal case in which the Court declined
to follow the neofederalist approach. The Court instead vacated and remanded, citing California
v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). See also Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241
(1978). But see New York v. P.J. Video Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986) (extending the doctrine to
quasi-criminal cases).
147. While the doctrine has not been extended thus far to this context, it could be in the
future. See Pennzoil v. Texaco, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (extending Younger abstention to its outer
limits). Ultimately, a bizarre set of circumstances could develop in which a federal district court
abstains from granting an injunction in favor of an asserted federal right, only later to find the
Supreme Court presuming jurisdiction over the same case because it feels the state court has
granted rights that are too extensive.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), (2) (1983). See also Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias,
225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912) (noting the Court's duty to review state court decisions holding against
a federal right).
149. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Illinois ex
rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561 (1906). "[T]his court will decide the Federal question if the
necessary effect of the judgment is to deny a Federal right or immunity ... which, if recognized
and enforced, would require a judgment different from one resting upon some ground of local
or general law." Id. at 580.
150. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1069 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
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The prevailing litigant had no interest in Supreme Court review since
he won at the state level. Yet it is this class of state court winners, and
only' 52 these winners, who are affected by the Supreme Court's pre-
sumption of jurisdiction in ambiguous cases. The Supreme Court as-
sumes jurisdiction and turns these state court winners into losers. The
Court accomplishes this by granting a writ of certiorari to the state
prosecutor or state officer who was unsuccessful in state court.'53 In
almost every case heard by the Court under the neofederalist adequate
state grounds doctrine, the Court has reversed a state court decision
entered in favor of a criminal defendant or other person litigating
against the state. 54 Today, it is a foregone conclusion when the Court
grants certiorari under the adequate state grounds doctrine that it will
reverse a state court decision that was in favor of an asserted federal
right. For some litigants the neofederalist adequate state grounds doc-
trine has been, quite literally, the kiss of death. 5
Assuring that one particular defendant is convicted is not of primary
interest to the Court. 5 6 When the Court has taken jurisdiction under
the Long doctrine ostensibly to correct a state court's erroneous inter-
pretation of federal law, it has done so not where the state court was
extending federal rights beyond Supreme Court precedent, but rather,
where the state court was accurately applying existing precedent. 5 7 In
each of these cases the Court has used its assumption of jurisdiction to
strangle a federal right. The Court's use of its certiorari jurisdiction for
the purpose of constricting individual liberties is an abuse of discre-
tion. 58 The Court rightly frowns on legislative enactments that punish
152. The doctrine has been extended to quasi-criminal cases. See supra note 146.
153. Long, 463 U.S. 1032.
154. An exception to the general rule does exist. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985). Caldwell involved the procedural strand of the adequate state grounds doctrine. The
defendant Caldwell successfully asserted that he had been denied a fair trial in the face of a
prosecutor's assertion that failure to comply with state procedural rules acted as an adequate and
independent bar to Supreme Court review.
155. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
156. See Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159 (1923). "The jurisdiction to bring up
cases by certiorari . . . was given for two purposes, first to secure uniformity of decision ...
and second, to bring up cases involving questions of importance which it is in the public interest
to have decided by this Court of last resort." Id. at 163. While the Court was specifically ad-
dressing the question of certiorari to the circuit courts of appeal, it later stated: "These remarks,
of course, apply also to applications for certiorari to review judgments and decrees of the highest
courts of States." Id. at 164.
157. In Long, for example, the Michigan court accurately applied the rule established in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court took jurisdiction over the case not because
the Michigan Court granted rights more extensive than the Supreme Court had granted, but
because it wished to extend Terry "stop and frisk" searches to car searches.
158. See supra notes 131-35. It is clear that the purpose of certiorari was to protect rights,
not to diminish them.
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retroactively 59 and has been known to strike down as violative of due
process state court decisions that have that effect.'16 Yet, under the
Long doctrine, the Court has shown no compunction about subjecting
litigants to new constructions of the Constitution16' of which they could
not possibly have had fair warning. 162
B. Expediency, Political and Otherwise: A Major Factor Underlying
the Court's Jurisdictional Policy
Ordinarily, whether justices hold that a current construction of the
Constitution does not afford enough protection to a particular right or,
as now seems to be the case, they hold too much protection is being
afforded, they must wait until an appropriate case comes before the
Court to express their views and establish new law. The vast majority
of criminal cases in the Supreme Court ascend from state courts.1 63 The
current formulation of the adequate state grounds doctrine gives the
Court much broader access to such cases. Therefore, one reason for
establishing the doctrine appears to be to accelerate the process of
bringing criminal cases before the Court. Now, it seems as though the
Court simply reaches out and finds a state court that is applying the
Constitution-regardless of whether it does so consistent with past
precedent-and then installs a new limitation on individual liberties.
The Court's new construction of the doctrine applies to the individual
litigant directly involved, and also to other present or future unfortun-
ates who attempt to invoke similar rights. 164
This expedient means of transforming federal law must be quite at-
tractive to the Court, 65 but it constitutes judicial activism on an unpre-
cedented scale. While one might sympathize with the Court's
impatience, judicial activism is to be discouraged.166 A clear example of
159. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9. See also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
160. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964).
161. Id. at 352 (discussing unforeseeable judicial constructions of a statute).
162. Id.
163. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042' n.8 (1983).
164. This holds true to an even greater extent for litigants who initiate cases in federal
courts. For them, there is no possibility that the court in question will extend greater rights than
the United States Supreme Court. At least in state court there is always the possibility, however
remote, that the state court will extend greater rights under the state constitution.
165. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("whenever we are persuaded by reasons of expediency to engage in the business of
giving legal advice, we chip away a part of the foundation of our independence and our
strength").
166. Even the Warren Court, frequently accused of judicial activism, did not interfere in the
operation of the local police power so long as the police action provided for the protection of
rights to an extent not beneath the minimal level prescribed by the Constitution.
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the Court's overanxiousness appears in Illinois v. Gates.167 In its haste
to narrow the fourth amendment, the Court erroneously certified for
argument the following question:
[W]hether the rule requiring the exclusion at criminal trial of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . should to any
extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of
evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure
at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 6
Since the issue had not been properly raised or argued in the courts
below, the Court apologized to the parties, dismissed the question, and
proceeded to move on to the issue properly before the Court. 69 Just
one year later, a majority ultimately concluded in United States v.
Leon 170 that there is a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Gates is also instructive in pointing out the jurisdictional turmoil that
engulfed the members of the Court at this time. Justice Rehnquist dedi-
cated nine pages of the majority opinion to a discussion of the Court's
jurisdiction over such cases.'17 Justice White concurred in a lengthy sep-
arate opinion contending that the Court had jurisdiction to decide the
issue of whether a good faith exception should be created. He noted
that the majority's finding that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the
issue merely "defer[s]" a decision on the good faith exception to a later
date. 172 The extensive discussion and apology by Justice Rehnquist
amount to little more than an invitation to state prosecutors to raise the
issue that ultimately was decided in Leon. Like the cases discussed in
this Comment, both Leon and Gates came about because the respective
state courts granted greater rights than the United States Supreme
Court was willing to allow. While the state court judgments rested sol-
idly within existing precedent, the Supreme Court granted writs of certi-
orari to state prosecutors to deny individual liberties.
Taking jurisdiction over ambiguously decided cases is an expeditious
way of establishing precedent. Ironically, the Court's decisions in these
kinds of cases may not bind the state courts to which they are directed.
167. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See also Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U.S. 1050, 1050 (1986) (memo-
randum of Brennan J.) (citing the Court's "unseemly eagerness to act as 'the adjunct of ...
prosecutors in facilitating efficient and expedient conviction."') (quoting Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 463 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Gates, 462 U.S. at 217.
169. Id.
170. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
171. Gates, 462 U.S. at 217-24.
172. Id. at 252 (White, J., concurring). Concern about a possible "delay" in deciding this
issue indicates that Justice White considers expediency to be a jurisdictional factor.
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This is true since the state court always has the option of extending
greater rights under the state constitution than the Supreme Court is
willing to grant under the Federal Constitution. 73 However, they are
binding on all federal courts. 174 They are also binding on all other state
courts that cannot, 175 or will not, extend individual rights beyond the
minimal level established by the Court's decisions.
There are a variety of political forces that keep state courts from ex-
tending greater rights than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution will allow. Probably the biggest factor is that state court
judges are typically elected and do not share the life tenure of their
federal counterparts. Some state courts have been limited in the rights
they can extend by state legislative action. The Supreme Court has en-
couraged state legislatures to take such action. One example of this ap-
pears in the amendment to the Florida State Constitution providing
that the state's search and seizure provision will be interpreted consis-
tent with United States Supreme Court interpretations of the fourth
amendment. 116 This referendum followed holdings by the Supreme
Court of Florida that the Florida Constitution afforded greater protec-
tion against unlawful search and seizure than did the United States
Constitution.177 While the Florida constitutional amendment is not at-
tributable to the Supreme Court, it is interesting to note that not long
after the amendment was passed, Justice Burger in Florida v. Casal7s
applauded the state's efforts to get its judiciary under control, extolling
the virtues of "rational" law enforcement. 179
A more startling example of political intervention by the Supreme
Court involved a series of events in California which were at least par-
tially attributable to the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Ra-
mos. s0 In 1972, the California Supreme Court, long known for
extending broad individual rights, struck down the state's death pen-
173. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., writing
for the majority); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
174. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
175. Id.
176. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (as amended by referendum Nov. 2, 1982).
177. See, e.g., State v. Dodd, 419 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1982) (exclusionary rule is applicable in
probation proceedings); Adoue v. State, 408 So. 2d 567, 577 (Fla. 1981) (Sundberg, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Hoberman v. State, 400 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1981); State v.
Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981); Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905, 909 (Fla. 1979).
178. 462 U.S. 637 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Only one year before the decision in
Long, the Court denied certiorari in Casal because the decision was based on an independent and
adequate state ground. Justice Burger was clearly disappointed with that result.. Today's Court
would not deny certiorari so readily.
179. Id. at 639.
180. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
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alty.'8' Soon thereafter the United States Supreme Court struck down
the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia.' Later that year, the Califor-
nia Legislature responded by amending its constitution to provide for
enforcement of all existing death penalty laws.18 3 In 1978, the Briggs
Instruction was passed which significantly broadened the existing law.' 4
The California court never struck down the death penalty law but it did
whittle away at portions of the Briggs Instruction passed in 1978. One
of the California court's more significant decisions in that regard was
People v. Ramos. 5 Defendant Ramos challenged the Briggs Instruc-
tion which allowed judges to instruct juries in death penalty cases con-
cerning the governor's power to commute or pardon persons who
received a death sentence. 86 The California Supreme Court struck
down the instruction on the basis that it gave the jury a false impression
about the possibility of gubernatorial intervention.'87 Meanwhile, a host
of conservative political organizations were stirring California voters to
vote certain state supreme court justices out of office. 88 The conserva-
tive dissatisfaction centered around the state supreme court's decisions
regarding the death penalty. 8 9 In the midst of this turmoil, the United
States Supreme Court took certiorari from the California State Prose-
cutor in the Ramos case.
Political motives aside, it is not clear why the Court chose to hear
this case. The Briggs Instruction was unique to California law. The
Court could not enter a decision that would bind other states.190 The
decision in People v. Ramos was clearly based on adequate and inde-
pendent state law. Given the uniqueness of the Briggs Instruction, no
relevant United States Supreme Court precedent existed. The primary
factor mitigating against an assumption of jurisdiction was the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's long history of independence' 91-particularly with
181. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
182. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
183. CAL. PENAl. CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
184. Codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
185. 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982), on remand, 37 Cal. 3d 136,
689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).
186. Id. at 590-91, 639 P.2d at 929-30, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90.
187. Id. at 591, 639 P.2d at 930, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
188. See Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: the Campaign, the Elector-
ate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, JUDICATURE, Apr.-May 1987, at 348; Reidinger,
Death in California, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1988, at 106; Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52.
189. See Wold & Culver, supra note 188.
190. See People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 591, 639 P.2d 908, 930, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 288
(1982) (noting that California was the only state with anything similar to the Briggs Instruction).
191. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); California v.
Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
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regard to issues concerning the death penalty. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court found the California Supreme Court decision ambiguous as to
whether it rested on federal or state law, and reversed. The Court
found that the Briggs Instruction did not conflict with the Federal Con-
stitution and invited the California court to extend broader rights under
the state constitution if appropriate. 192
In view of the political climate that prevailed in California, the Su-
preme Court must have been aware that the members of the California
court would be limited in their discretionary power to act independently
of the United States Supreme Court's decision. Nonetheless, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court used its discretion to reverse the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ramos.'93 That action proved to be a pyr-
rhic victory for the California justices. In the subsequent election cam-
paign the decision was cited as one of the three worst ever entered by
the justices. 94 Ultimately, three California justices, including Chief
Justice Rose Bird, were defeated in their bid for reelection.' 95 The
United States Supreme Court's decision in Ramos undoubtedly acceler-
ated their defeat. It has been noted since that "[a]t a time when other
state high courts are charting courses independent from that of the
United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court now seems
inclined, at least in its death penalty decisions, to toe the line laid down
by the High Court."'96 The United States Supreme Court no longer hes-
itates to advise the California justices about how they should decide
cases. In Tison v. Arizona,197 the Supreme Court indicated that an ear-
lier California Supreme Court decision, Carlos v. Superior Court, 98
holding that felony murderers could not be executed absent an intent to
kill, was in error. In People v. Anderson,'"9 the California Supreme
Court reversed Carlos, citing the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Tison. However, in an interesting twist, the California court
granted Anderson a new trial. The basis for the order was the Rose
Bird court's final decision in People v. Ramos.2 0 The judge in Ander-
son had given the jury a Briggs Instruction which is still forbidden by
the California Constitution. Thanks to People v. Ramos, the Anderson
192. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 997 n.7 (1983).
193. 37 Cal. 3d 136, 159, 689 P.2d 430, 444, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 814 (1984).
194. See JUDICATURE, Apr.-May 1987. (Cover depicts a campaign flyer describing Ramos as
one of the court's worst decisions because it "struck down the death penalty").
195. Reidinger, Death in California, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1988, at 106.
196. Id.
197. 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
198. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
199. 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
200. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
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decision is totally grounded in state law and unassailable by the United
States Supreme Court.
Whether its purpose is to transform state criminal law or to project a
particular political posture, when the underlying policy of the United
States Supreme Court is expediency, principles are little more than illu-
sions. The ultimate result can only be a decline in respect for the
Court20 1 with the resulting danger that the power of the Court's deci-
sions will be diminished.
IV. WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BRING?
The key adequate state grounds case of Michigan v. Long2°2 was a
moderately strong 6-3 decision on the substantive constitutional issue.
Technically, it was a weaker 5-4 decision on the jurisdictional question.
This is misleading, however, because while Justice Brennan did not for-
mally concur with the majority on the new jurisdictional policy, he did
indicate in a footnote his agreement with the majority's position on that
issue.2 03 This is surprising given that his is usually considered a solid
vote in favor of individual liberties.2°4 The rationale behind his position
is not entirely clear, and the possible reasons suggested here are admit-
tedly pure speculation. It may be his belief that the current willingness
by the Court to take jurisdiction over close cases will make it easier for
a more liberally disposed Court to override the objections of justices
asserting that an independent and adequate state ground exists. He may
also feel that should state courts adopt his suggested approach-extend-
ing greater rights under state constitutions than the Supreme Court has
allowed under the Federal Constitution, the plain statement require-
ment of Long would effectively insulate their decisions from Supreme
Court review. 205 This rationale ignores the fact that state court judges
are often subject to political pressures and, therefore, may be less in-
clined to expand individual liberties. 2°6 It also ignores the fact that a
politically motivated Supreme Court might, again, alter the adequate
state grounds doctrine. This could easily happen if the doctrine were
seen as no longer serving its present purposes.
201. Clear evidence of this exists in the positions taken by authors of law review articles on
the subject. See, e.g., Seid, supra note 61, at 72-73.
202. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
203. Id. at 1054 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. The clearest evidence of this appears in Long itself. Justice Brennan's dissent was based
on his desire to uphold the defendant's right against unreasonable search and seizure.
205. See Welsh, supra note 99, at 1126-28 (discussing the unreviewable state court decision).
See also Brennan, The Bill of Rights and The States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986) (arguing for the independence of
state constitutions).
206. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
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Another possible factor may be Justice Brennan's well-known and
long standing opposition to the death penalty. 20 7 He may perceive, as
others have, that Michigan v. Long, if fully extended into the area of
the procedural adequate state grounds doctrine, would eliminate the
hurdles of procedural default that so often bar death sentenced indivi-
duals from asserting their federal rights. It would do so by substituting
the Long presumption of jurisdiction208 for the Wainwright v. Sykes
requirement that a defendant must show cause for failure to comply
with state procedural rules together with actual prejudice resulting from
the alleged constitutional violation .2 9
Caldwell v. Mississippi2 10 represents one such application of Long; it
also represents the only instance this author is aware of in which the
neofederalist adequate state grounds doctrine has been applied to vindi-
cate a federal right. Application of the doctrine to federal habeas cor-
pus proceedings could have even broader implications, applying the
presumption of jurisdiction to all cases in which the convicted state
prisoner seeks to assert a federal right. 21 , 'While seemingly willing to go
along with the majority for the present, Justice Brennan has not been
an outspoken supporter of the Court's policy, at least not in the context
of a case opinion. 212 His attitude could change if the current trend con-
tinues and his possible expectations for the doctrine fail to develop.
Justice O'Connor also presents a position that is difficult to assess.
As the author of many of the Court's recent jurisdiction expanding
cases, including Michigan v. Long, 21 she has indicated consistently that
207. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan J., concurring) (find-
ing that the death penalty violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment).
208. See Robson & Mello, supra note 88.
209. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). The Court also noted that there was an
"independent and adequate state procedural ground which would have prevented direct review
here." Id. One is left to wonder why the Court heard the case if there was an independent and
adequate state basis for the decision. The only likely answer is that the Court needed the Sykes
case, since it presented an opportunity to cut back on the more liberal review standards of Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437 (1963). See supra note 116.
210. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
211. Sykes, together with Caldwell, presents these possibilities. Sykes was not a direct review
case but arrived at the Supreme Court through the lower federal courts where the defendant had
sought relief by way of habeus corpus. The case is discussed by the Court as both a direct review
type procedural adequate state grounds case and as a procedural default case, However, the case
predates Long and one must, therefore, recognize the importance of Caldwell v. Mississippi.
That case extends Long's presumption of jurisdiction to the procedural adequate state grounds
area. It is only a step from there to extend the presumption to habeas corpus cases involving
procedural default. Sykes is significant in that respect because it indicates that cases involving
habeus corpus-procedural default can be treated in the same way as procedural adequate state
grounds cases. See Robson & Mello, supra note 88, at 109.
212. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1054 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. 463 U.S. at 1034.
1988] ADEQUATE & INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS 399
the doctrine presented in Long is not written in stone.2 14 She seems to
leave the door open to change position should the neofederalist Long
doctrine prove ineffective in eliminating jurisdictional problems. About
the doctrine she has said, "Notwithstanding the advantages of the rule,
I must add a word of caution about Michigan v. Long. The Court did
• not adopt this rule unanimously. It will take time to see whether the
principle Michigan v. Long adopts will serve our judicial federalism
well. 12 15 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor was also the author of the
Court's opinion in South Dakota v. Neville.216 She likely views the out-
come of that case as a personal disaster. Should such results continue to
occur, she might eventually change her position on the adequate state
grounds issue. While her overall record indicates that she does not place
the vindication of individual liberties high on her priority list, several
recent opinions indicate that her attitudes in this area may be shifting. 217
She has gradually risen to a position of seniority2 8 and could ultimately
lead the Court away from its present policy just as she originally led it
in that direction.
Justice Stevens has been the strongest and most consistent opponent
of the Court's presumptive jurisdictional policy. He has written many
eloquent dissents on the subject, 219 and his position in this regard is un-
questioned. He is joined by Justice Marshall.
The other justices on the Court apparently remain staunch supporters
of the current doctrine. Even assuming that the Court's latest addition,
Justice Anthony Kennedy, proves to be opposed to the doctrine and
Justices Brennan and O'Connor change their current positions, a ma-
jority could not be mustered to prevent the Court from presuming ju-
risdiction over ambiguously decided cases.
A more interesting and more likely reason for alteration or abandon-
ment of the Court's policy would be an unwillingness on the part of
state courts to go along with the Supreme Court's plain statement re-
quirement. A possible perception of state court judges, who are aware
of the change in the Court's jurisdictional policy, is that it has resulted
in only moderate reductions in individual liberties. Many state court
214. Id. at 1041 n.6.
215. O'Connor, supra note 27, at 8.
216. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
217. See United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3065 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Miller v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 2453 (1987); Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1173 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
218. Justice O'Connor is now ranked fifth in seniority on the Court. At least three Justices,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, can be expected to retire within the next few years.
219. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cali-
fornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1029 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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judges may truly have believed that they were compelled by the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution to grant more
extensive rights, particularly to criminal defendants, than they would
have preferred. Should an increasingly conservative Court make wider
and deeper inroads into individual liberties, respect for the Court is
likely to decline and consequently, negative responses from state courts
are likely to increase.20 There are likely to be more majority opinions
along the lines of the dissent authored by Justice Shea in State v. Jack-
son.221 In his dissent, Justice Shea rejected the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Neville,2 2 2 which held that admitting a defendant's refusal to
submit to a blood-alcohol test into evidence is not a violation of his
right against self-incrimination. Theoretically, a state court could issue
a per curiam opinion simply stating that the Supreme Court has issued
an unconstitutional advisory opinion which the state court chooses to
ignore and that its original decision was based on an obviously inde-
pendent and adequate state ground.223 It is difficult to speculate on the
level of disrespect the Supreme Court would be willing to tolerate be-
fore altering its policy, but a prolonged or deep-seated response could
have severe negative consequences for our federalist system.
V. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH FOR THE PRACTICING ATTORNEY
The implications of Long for the practicing attorney are substantial.
As unwise and inappropriate as it might be, it shows no signs of being
abandoned in the near future. For that reason, this Comment would be
incomplete without some suggestions on how to avoid the doctrine's
pitfalls.
Since questions not raised at the trial level usually cannot be raised
on appeal, it is important for the trial lawyer to argue legal points on
both federal and state grounds. This approach safeguards both avenues
of argument for appeal. Where possible, an attorney on appeal should
be careful to point out those situations in which precedent has estab-
220. Recently, the Court's application of the adequate state grounds doctrine to expedite its
program of modifying state criminal law has slowed. There have been fewer such decisions than
in the peak years of the early eighties. It could be that the Court is simply reaching the limits of
its conservative agenda. If that is the case, perhaps the substantive adequate state grounds doc-
trine will be of diminishing significance. Instead, the presumption of jurisdiction in ambiguously
decided cases may prove to be of increasing importance in the procedural adequate state grounds
area.
221. 206 Mont. 338, 351, 672 P.2d 255, 261 (1983) (Shea, J., dissenting).
222. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). This was certainly a case in which the
state court controlled the final outcome.
223. Id. Neville was not a per curiam opinion, but it came close to the scenario described
here.
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lished that a position being argued constitutes an independent and ade-
quate state ground for decision. A court predisposed to a favorable
ruling is likely to welcome the opportunity to present that ruling in a
fashion that safeguards it from review by the United States Supreme
Court. For the same reason, it would be wise to suggest to the state
appellate court that it has the power to grant greater rights under the
state law than federal law, provided the Court makes clear that its deci-
sion is based on an independent and adequate state ground. This is true
even though the state court may not have shown an inclination to do so
previously. Many state courts have not firmly established an approach
to dealing with the Court's new jurisdictional policy, and no harm is
done by suggesting an approach favorable to individual liberties.
While it is important to bring the possibility of ruling on an inde-
pendent and adequate state ground to the court's attention, it is equally
important to continue to present issues as a matter of federal law as
well. Should the court ultimately rule against the asserted federal right,
the attorney, by arguing federal law, preserves the right of appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. This is true even where the state court
asserts that it has ruled against the federal right on an independent and
adequate state ground basis.
Attorneys faced with procedural default problems, either on direct
review by the United States Supreme Court or in the context of a peti-
tion for habeas corpus, should take full advantage of the presumption
of jurisdiction created in the substantive adequate state grounds area.
They should be able to argue successfully that Caldwell v. Mississippi2"4
extends the rule to the procedural adequate state grounds area and that
Wainwright v. Sykes225 creates a logical nexus between habeas corpus
and procedural adequate state grounds. But beware the language in
Sykes, indicating that procedural and substantive cases have tradition-
ally been treated differently.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined each of the principles put forward by
the Supreme Court as a basis for its recent neofederalist formulation of
the adequate state grounds doctrine. At each stage of the discussion
questions have been posed: How can the Court assert federalism as the
basis for a policy so clearly opposed to the father of federalism, James
Madison? How can it assert that a doctrine bringing prosecutorial peti-
tions to the Supreme Court in astounding numbers is actually an aid to
224. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
225. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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docket control? Why should uniformity of federal law be a more signif-
icant factor in jurisdictional decisions than the redress of rights particu-
larly in the context of a dualistic doctrine that grants one standard of
review to state prosecutors and a different, tougher, standard to defen-
dants facing procedural default? How can one reconcile the current for-
mulation of the adequate state grounds doctrine with the court's other
neo-federalist policies? Where is the common thread that binds all of
these questions together to present a consistent picture of the Court's
jurisdictional policies?
In an attempt to answer these questions the author asserts that the
present Court is uncomfortable with the breadth of individual liberties,
both those granted by state courts and by past Supreme Court deci-
sions. The thread of consistency in all of the Court's policies is found
not in its rhetoric but in the practical impact of its decisions-the nar-
rowing of individual liberties. For that reason, the author argues that
the Court's current formulation of the substantive adequate state
grounds doctrine-presuming jurisdiction in ambiguously decided
cases-should be abandoned. The Court should also abandon its policy
of granting certiorari to state prosecutors. No policy interest is served
by reversing state decisions that uphold a federal right. In the context
of the procedural adequate state grounds doctrine, a state procedural
rule should never take precedence over an asserted federal right. The
neofederalist presumption of jurisdiction has some application in ambi-
guously decided cases involving questions of procedural default; but,
logically there should be a presumption of jurisdiction in all such cases
whether ambiguously decided or not.
More than any other factor, the purpose of federalist government is
to provide for the rights of its citizens. When it fails in that purpose, it
fails utterly. Madison's retort to the anti-federalists is as true today as it
was when he authored it: "the ultimate authority . . . resides in the
people alone . . . it will not depend merely on the comparative ambi-
tions or address of different governments, whether either, or which of
them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of
the other."2 6
226. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 12, at 322.
